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ARTICLES
EXTENDING FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 4(K)(2):
A WAY TO (PARTIALLY) CLEAN UP
THE PERSONAL JURISDICTION MESS
PATRICK J. BORCHERS*
The Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence has become
increasingly constricted and remains unclear on many crucial questions. However,
it appears that the Court will not rethink its basic approach to determining whether
the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state. The Supreme Court
has heard five cases concerning personal jurisdiction since 2011, and it has
decided all five in favor of defendants. As a result, U.S. plaintiffs can be left
without a U.S. forum, even though they are injured in the United States by
foreign corporations and the suits arise from the foreign corporations’ purposeful
efforts to benefit from the U.S. market. Moreover, other important issues, such
as the significance of virtual contacts, lie unresolved. This Article proposes a
practicable solution to the worst of the problems: the lack of a U.S. forum for
domestic plaintiffs injured in the United States by foreign defendants. The
proposed solution is to extend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2)—which
in its current form allows for nationwide personal jurisdiction in federal question
cases in which the plaintiff would not have another U.S. forum—to include
diversity and alienage cases. While this solution would not resolve all difficult
issues, it would work to the advantage of U.S. plaintiffs by ensuring a local
forum and benefit U.S. defendants by leveling the playing field between them
and their foreign counterparts. This Article then considers whether the Rules
*
Lillis Family Distinguished Professor of Law, Creighton University School of Law.
Thanks to Professors Peter Hay, Richard Freer, Irina Fox, Michael Hoffheimer,
Christopher Whytock, and the Hon. Richard Kopf for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts.
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Enabling Act would authorize an extension of Federal Rule 4(k)(2) and if it
would be constitutional. The Article concludes that an extended Rule 4(k)(2)
would survive challenges under both the Rules Enabling Act and the Constitution.
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INTRODUCTION
I am tired of writing articles complaining about the dismal state of
the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence—and
complain I have. I have argued that the Constitution does not require
significant restraints on jurisdiction.1 I have argued that the famous
case of Pennoyer v. Neff2 quite plausibly invoked the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment only to guarantee the defendant a right
to challenge jurisdiction, not to regulate the limits of state-court
jurisdiction. Thus, the whole notion that the Supreme Court needs to
closely supervise assertions of personal jurisdiction might be a giant
misunderstanding.3 I have argued that the Supreme Court’s recent

1. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Jones v. Flowers: An Essay on a Unified Theory of
Procedural Due Process, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 343, 346–48 (2007).
2. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
3. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction:
From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 38–51 (1990).
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decisions are wrong, badly reasoned, or both.4 I have argued that the
current restraints on jurisdiction are at least as severe as those imposed
by the implied consent and presence fictions that pre-dated the
current “minimum contacts” test the Court first announced in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.5
But I, and like-minded
commentators, have not made any headway with the Court.6 So my
aim in this Article is to propose a solution other than having the Court
completely rethink its approach to personal jurisdiction, which
appears unlikely to occur.7
Not all commentators are as despondent as am I. Some have
applauded the Court’s recent opinions restricting corporate general
jurisdiction8—that is, jurisdiction based on contacts with the forum

For a related argument regarding Pennoyer, see Steven E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right,
95 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1309–14 (2017), which asserts that the discussion of the Due Process
Clause in Pennoyer may have been dicta, but the case was correctly decided regardless.
4. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the
Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1245–46 (2011).
5. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see also Patrick J. Borchers, The Twilight of the Minimum
Contacts Test, 11 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 3–4 (2014).
6. However, of some personal consolation, the Supreme Court cited one of my
articles. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 758 n.9 (2014) (citing Patrick J.
Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 139 (2001)
(“[G]eneral jurisdiction exists as an imperfect safety valve that sometimes allows
plaintiffs access to a reasonable forum in cases when specific jurisdiction would deny
it.”)). My point was that a relatively expansive notion of general jurisdiction was
necessary to fill in the gaps left by overly constricted specific jurisdiction principles.
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011) and its progeny’s
retraction of corporate general jurisdiction to the corporation’s “home” would, in my
view, be unproblematic if it did not leave many plaintiffs without any U.S. forum, even
when foreign defendants injure plaintiffs in the United States and in so doing reap the
benefits of the U.S. market.
7. See Stephen E. Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, NW. U. L.
REV., 1301, 1305 (2014) (explaining why the Supreme Court is unlikely to rethink its
approach to personal jurisdiction).
8. See, e.g., Carol Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 47 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 999, 1081 (2012) (contending that the restrictive view offered in
Goodyear simplified the general personal jurisdiction analysis); Michael H. Hoffheimer,
General Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60
U. KAN. L. REV. 549, 572–73 (2012) (discussing Justice Ginsburg’s attempt in Goodyear
to clarify the level of activity required for general personal jurisdiction); Wm. Grayson
Lambert, The Necessary Narrowing of General Personal Jurisdiction, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 375,
375 (2016) (arguing that the restrictive interpretation of general personal jurisdiction
provides a sense of consistency and predictability).
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state unrelated to the suit9—to states where the defendant is
“essentially at home.”10 I would have little problem with so restricting
general jurisdiction if specific jurisdiction—that is, jurisdiction based
on contacts with the forum state related to the suit11—had not become
unreasonably constricted. Many commentators agree that there are at
least some problematic aspects to personal jurisdiction law.12
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s failure to decide important issues that
are splitting lower courts—such as the significance of virtual contacts,13
the degree to which defendants must target a forum state in products
liability suits based on local injuries,14 the line between related and
unrelated contacts,15 and so on—has left lower courts trying to make
sense out of the nonsense.16

9. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966) (introducing the terms “specific”
and “general” jurisdiction).
10. See Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 751; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 915.
11. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1785 n.2
(2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (describing recent limitations on general
jurisdiction as “ill advised”).
12. See, e.g., Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant
Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 101,
104–07 (2015) (noting that even though Justice Ginsburg’s analysis in Daimler was
reasoned in protecting corporations from unduly burdens, the same consideration was
not given to the burdens that individuals will face, and thus corporations are given
“unprecedented” power to predetermine what states or countries they can be sued in
and what law will apply to them); Donald L. Doernberg, Resolving International Shoe,
2 TEX. A&M L. REV. 247, 254–55 (2014) (recognizing the imbalance between
corporations and individuals regarding personal jurisdiction); Richard D. Freer, Some
Specific Concerns with the New General Jurisdiction, 15 NEV. L.J. 1161, 1164–65 (2015)
(commenting that the Court has had “historic failure [in] explain[ing] the function
of general jurisdiction”); Jack B. Harrison, Registration, Fairness, and General Jurisdiction,
95 NEB. L. REV. 477, 479–80 (2016) (questioning the viability of personal jurisdiction).
13. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 890 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (questioning the sufficiency of rules limiting jurisdiction
in relation to virtual contacts); see also infra notes 179–94 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 753 F.3d 521,
548 n.26 (5th Cir. 2014) (recognizing that the stream-of-commerce test contradicts the
McIntyre plurality test because the stream-of-commerce test does not require that the
defendant target the forum state).
15. See, e.g., Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 579–85
(Tex. 2007) (examining the various tests courts have developed to address how close
a defendant’s forum activities must be to the cause of action).
16. See, e.g., Lambeth Magnetic Structures, L.L.C. v. Toshiba Corp., No. 14-1526,
2017 WL 782892, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2017) (considering the various tests available
and finding the O’Connor test to be most suitable).
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However, there is a relatively straightforward (albeit partial)
solution, which is to amend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) to
include cases brought in federal court on diversity of citizenship or
alienage grounds.17 This Article is not the first to mention the
extension of Rule 4(k)(2) to diversity and alienage cases,18 but the
possibility of so extending Rule 4(k)(2)—and the potential objections
to doing so—have received little attention thus far.
Rule 4(k)(2) currently allows federal courts in federal question cases
(maybe in admiralty, too19) to extend their jurisdictional reach to the
constitutional limits if no U.S. forum would otherwise have
jurisdiction.20 Because federal courts are organs of the federal
government, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment governs
them, while the Fourteenth Amendment applies to states.21 Although
the Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue,22 most lower courts
and other authorities are of the opinion that some variant of the
“national contacts” test applies to cases under the Fifth Amendment.23
This test asks not whether the defendant has minimum contacts with
any particular state but rather with the United States as a whole.24 The

17. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012) (conferring federal subject matter jurisdiction in cases
between citizens of different states and citizens of a foreign state and citizens of a U.S. state).
18. I briefly mentioned the possibility after the J. McIntyre decision, see Borchers,
supra note 4, at 1274–75, and at least three other commentators also noted it. See
Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2011: Twenty-Fifth Annual
Survey, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 291, 305 (2012); Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court
and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 313, 348 (2012). Professor Steven E. Sachs,
picking up on my brief post-J. McIntyre suggestion, discusses it and argues that an
expanded Rule 4(k)(2) would not do enough to solve the problems. See Stephen E.
Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1301, 1325
(2014). His proposal is for a federal statute, but—as I discuss—I believe that a federal
statute is politically infeasible. See infra notes 233–38 and accompanying text. One
commentator has suggested revising Rule 4(k)(1)(A), but only in federal question cases.
See Daniel Klerman, Walden v. Fiore and the Federal Courts: Rethinking FRCP 4(k)(1)(A) and
Stafford v. Briggs, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 713, 716–17 (2015) (advocating for this
change to give plaintiffs multiple U.S. forums in federal question cases).
19. See, e.g., World Tanker Carriers Corp. v. MV Ya Mawlaya, 99 F.3d 717, 723 (5th
Cir. 1996) (“[W]e conclude that federal law includes admiralty cases for the purposes
of Rule 4(k)(2).”).
20. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2).
21. See PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS
479–80 (5th ed. 2010) (noting that in federal litigation the Fifth Amendment limits
federal authority and in state litigation the Fourteenth Amendment limits state authority).
22. See infra notes 265–70 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 269–87 and accompanying text.
24. See infra note 269–70 and accompanying text.
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plurality opinion in J. McIntyre Machinery Co. v. Nicastro25 suggested in
dictum that a federal statute conferring national personal jurisdiction
in products liability cases would be constitutional.26 Assuming the Fifth
Amendment allows national personal jurisdiction, a federal statute
would cure the perverse result that some foreign defendants can
benefit commercially from the U.S. market yet avoid suit in any U.S.
court, even if the suit is based on those activities.27
The chances of enacting such a federal statute are slim at best. Even
very limited efforts in this direction have failed to advance in
Congress.28 Professor Steven E. Sachs has made a thoughtful argument
for a federal statute to fix the jurisdictional mess.29 However, any
attempt to enact through Congress even slightly plaintiff-friendly
jurisdictional reform will run into devastating political opposition,
regardless of which major party controls Congress or the White
House.30 Business interests and the law firms that represent them have
celebrated the slew of defense-friendly jurisdictional decisions of the
last six years.31 It is vastly easier to stop legislation than to pass
25. 564 U.S. 873 (2011) (plurality opinion).
26. Id. at 885–86; see also HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 21, at 480 n.6
(collecting statutes authorizing “nationwide service” of process). Admittedly, I lambasted
the J. McIntyre plurality opinion as “quite possibly the most poorly reasoned and obtuse
decision of the entire minimum contacts era.” See Borchers, supra note 4, at 1263.
27. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., 564 U.S. at 885 (plurality opinion) (agreeing that the
defendant targeted the U.S. market).
28. See infra notes 235–38 and accompanying text.
29. See Sachs, supra note 18, at 1348–49.
30. A very limited effort to expand jurisdiction in products liability cases has failed
to advance regardless of which major political party is in power. See infra note 235.
31. For instance, consider just a snippet of commentary on the Supreme Court’s
utterly unsurprising ruling in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773,
1781–84 (2017), in which the Court held that the forum state lacked specific
jurisdiction over the non-residents’ products liability claim against the defendant
because there was no connection between the forum state and their claim. See, e.g.,
Sarah Karlin-Smith, Supreme Court Ruling in Drug Case Could Have Big Implications for
Product Liability, POLITICO (June 19, 2017, 10:34 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/
2017/06/19/supreme-court-bristol-myers-squib-239712
(highlighting
the
disproportionate disadvantages for plaintiffs seeking to bring a claim against a
corporate defendant resulting from the Bristol-Myers Squib decision); Andrew J. Pincus
et al., Supreme Court’s Decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court Rejects Expansive
View
of
Specific
Jurisdiction,
CLASS DEF. BLOG
(June
19,
2017),
https://www.classdefenseblog.com/2017/01/supreme-court-will-review-twoimportant-cases-regarding-scope-personal-jurisdiction (commenting that the BristolMyers-Squibb decision served to recognize “important limits imposed by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process clause on the ability of courts to adjudicate cases that
aggregate the claims of plaintiffs from many jurisdictions”).
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legislation, and considerable resources will inevitably pour into
maintaining the current defense-friendly jurisdictional regime.
However, meaningful (and controversial) changes to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure are possible, as the major 2015 revisions to the rules
show.32 Moreover, expanding Rule 4(k)(2) is unlikely to generate the
political opposition that a broad federal jurisdictional statute would
because amending Rule 4(k)(2) would—as a practical matter—mostly
affect foreign defendants and work to the benefit of both U.S. plaintiffs
and defendants.33
In Part I, I review what I see as the most problematic aspects of the
current state of personal jurisdiction law. In Part II, I propose the
extension of Rule 4(k)(2) to diversity and alienage cases. In Part III, I
consider possible objections to adding diversity and alienage cases to
the scope of Rule 4(k)(2).
These include possible practical
shortcomings of this solution, whether it would violate the Rules
Enabling Act,34 and whether it would violate the Constitution.
Extending Rule 4(k)(2) would solve one of the worst practical
problems created by the law of personal jurisdiction and an extension
would not violate the Rules Enabling Act or the Constitution.
I.

PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS

The current personal jurisdiction landscape is full of problems, the
worst of which would be solved by extending Rule 4(k)(2). What
follows is a discussion of some of those problems. While this is not an
exhaustive catalog of all the problematic and unresolved issues lurking
in jurisdiction jurisprudence, it nonetheless should make my point
that jurisdiction law has problems that need fixing.
A. Non-Intentional Torts
Specific jurisdiction as to non-intentional torts is unclear and too
constricted. The original sin was World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson,35 which held that Oklahoma could not exercise jurisdiction
32. See, e.g., Adam N. Steinman, The End of an Era? Federal Civil Procedure After the
2015 Amendments, 66 EMORY L.J. 1, 1 (2016) (“The recent amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were the most controversial in decades.”); see also Brian J.
Pollack & Peter Swann, The Rules Governing Parties, Discovery and Disclosure, ARIZ. ATT’Y,
Dec. 2016 at 18, 18–19 (noting controversy over whether to adopt new federal rules on
the scope of discovery as part of the Arizona rules).
33. See infra notes 243–47 and accompanying text.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
35. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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over the New York dealer and the regional distributor of an automobile
involved in an accident in the forum state.36 The plaintiffs in the case
had brought a products liability action on the theory that the gas tank’s
placement made the car vulnerable to igniting if struck from behind.37
In denying jurisdiction, the Court gave short shrift to practical
considerations, including the convenience of an Oklahoma forum
(the bulk of the evidence was located there) and foreseeability that a
mobile product such as a car would be used out of state.38 It held that
considerations of “interstate federalism” could lead courts to deny
jurisdiction to even the most convenient forum.39
The Court, however, announced the “stream of commerce” test.40 Its
citation to a famous state court decision implied strongly that selling a
product in the forum state—through normal commercial channels—would
create minimum contacts in a suit regarding the safety of the product.41
Alas, matters turned out to be far from so simple. In a 1987 decision,
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,42 the Court divided four-to36. Id. at 298–99. The back story of the case is extensively recounted in Charles
W. Adams, World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson—The Rest of the Story, 72 NEB. L. REV.
1122 (1993). Although the Supreme Court’s opinion assumed that the issues involved
the convenience to the parties and state sovereignty, the motion to dismiss the dealer
and the distributor from the case had nothing to do with either. Instead, the
defendants were trying to create full diversity and get the case removed from state to
federal court, and they succeeded in doing so. Id. at 1139. The plaintiffs still had two
deep-pocketed defendants—Audi and Volkswagen—as parties in the case, and in an
era of joint-and-several liability, having the distributor and the dealer as parties only
served to keep the case in a plaintiff-friendly state court venue. Id. at 1127–28. The
defense’s strategy was to remove the case to federal court because it was a more
defense-friendly forum. Id. at 1128–29.
37. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 288.
38. Id. at 295.
39. Id. at 294. The Supreme Court seemed to back away from the sovereignty rationale
just two years later. See Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694, 703 n.10 (1982) (explaining that the Due Process Clause “makes no
mention of federalism concerns”). Recently, however, the sovereignty rationale has made a
comeback. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 879–80 (2011)
(plurality opinion) (relying on the “general rule” that the sovereign may exercise its power
when the defendant avails himself of the benefits and privileges of the forum state).
40. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297–98 (“The forum State does not
exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over
a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.”).
41. Id. at 297–98 (citing Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176
N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961) (holding that the manufacturer of a valve on a water heater was
subject to jurisdiction where the manufacturer sold the heater in the forum state)).
42. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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four-to-one on whether the sale of approximately 100,000 motorcycle
tire valves in the forum state sufficed to establish minimum contacts in
a case alleging a defect in one of the valves, leading to a tire blowout.43
Four Justices opined that predictable sales were not enough unless
accompanied by other indicia of affirmative efforts to serve the state
market,44 four other Justices said that predictable sales sufficed,45 and
one Justice refused to endorse either test.46 Lower courts were
predictably confused.47
Then, in 2011, the Court appeared poised to resolve the split in
J. McIntyre but managed the remarkable feat of further confusing
matters.48 The case involved a three-ton, $24,000 scrap metal recycling
machine manufactured in and sold from England by an English
corporation.49 A nominally independent (though similarly named)
U.S. distributor in Ohio sold the machine to a buyer who had seen one
at a trade show in Nevada and who thereafter bought and used it in
New Jersey.50 The plaintiff, an operator who had four fingers of one
hand sliced off by the machine while at work in New Jersey, sued the
English manufacturer in New Jersey state court alleging that the
machine was unreasonably unsafe.51
The Court’s four-vote plurality opinion, which found that New Jersey
violated the Constitution in taking jurisdiction, was laced with
overwrought references to the threat to sovereignty caused by courts
overstepping their boundaries. The opinion called into question the

43. Id. at 105 (plurality opinion).
44. Id. at 112–13.
45. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
46. Id. at 121–22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice Stevens endorsed neither test, reasoning that Asahi had minimum contacts
under either test based on the volume of the sales of its valves in California. Id. at 122.
47. See HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 21, at 419–21 (discussing the lack of
consensus in lower courts on which test from Asahi to apply and to which types of cases).
48. See J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011); see also Kaitlyn
Findley, Paddling Past Nicastro in the Stream of Commerce Doctrine: Interpreting Justice
Breyer’s Concurrence as Implicitly Inviting Lower Courts to Develop Alternative Jurisdictional
Standards, 63 EMORY L.J. 695, 700 (2014) (“Yet again, the Court issued a split decision,
reinforcing the divide between the competing tests in Asahi and seemingly cementing
the doctrine’s analytical instability.”).
49. J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd., 564 U.S. at 894 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 894–96.
51. Id. at 878 (plurality opinion).
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entire stream-of-commerce concept.52 The likely controlling53 two-vote
concurrence in the judgment refused to take sides in the debate
regarding which stream-of-commerce test should prevail but found
that because the record showed only one such machine having been
sold in the forum state, its courts lacked jurisdiction under either
version of the test.54 The dissent pointed to the defendantmanufacturer’s obvious desire to take advantage of the U.S. market
and the foreseeability of a New Jersey sale, and stated it would have
found jurisdiction.55 Thus, the question of whether sale of an allegedly
defective product in the forum state through ordinary commercial
channels suffices for jurisdiction is no closer to resolution than it was
three decades ago.
Of course, many non-intentional tort cases do not involve products
liability, but the products cases present the most difficult and
interesting jurisdictional cases. Moreover, the extent to which the
defendant must target his actions at the forum state in non-products
cases is not resolved in other contexts.56
B. General Jurisdiction
Although the case law was a morass, many lower courts once took
the view that some corporations have such extensive operations
throughout the United States (take General Motors as an example)
that they were subject to jurisdiction in any of the fifty states regardless
of whether the suit bore any relationship to the forum state.57 This
view drew from International Shoe, which stated that corporations were

52. See id. at 879–80.
53. See Borchers, supra note 4, at 1265 (“Because Justice Breyer’s opinion and the
dissent commanded five votes combined, and the concurrence involved the narrowest
rationale for invalidating the attempted exercise of jurisdiction, lower courts will likely
follow Justice Breyer’s opinion.”).
54. J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd., 564 U.S. at 888–89 (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment). One might argue that J. McIntyre at least makes clear that a single sale cannot
suffice, but given the narrowness of Justice Breyer’s opinion, even that is not entirely
clear. If the single sale had been a multi-million-dollar jet, it is difficult to say whether
the concurrence would have found the single sale sufficient to establish jurisdiction.
55. Id. at 893 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
56. See HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 21, at 424–27 (suggesting that the
minimum contacts analysis can be instructive in navigating non-product negligence cases and
the purposeful availment analysis can be instructive in non-product strict liability cases).
57. See generally Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON
HALL L. REV. 807, 808–09 (2004) (noting case law employs broader theories than the
academic calls to limit general jurisdiction).
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subject to suit wherever they had “systematic and continuous” contacts;
the Court held that having about a dozen salesmen and selling roughly
$30,000 worth of shoes annually in the forum state sufficed.58
Until recently, the Court did not have much to say about general
jurisdiction. In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,59 the Court
held that a corporation was subject to jurisdiction in the state in which
it had temporarily located its corporate headquarters.60 In Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,61 the Court held that four million
dollars of unrelated purchases in the forum state was not enough to
sustain jurisdiction.62 A huge range of activities lies between these
poles, and lower courts were in the wilderness regarding what sufficed
for general jurisdiction.63
That changed with the Supreme Court’s 2011 opinion in Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown.64 Goodyear was an easy case that
the North Carolina state courts got wrong.65 The suit arose after a
European subsidiary of the American tire giant Goodyear
58. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945) (holding that the activities
of defendant were “systematic and continuous throughout the years in question”).
59. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
60. Id. at 447–48. The Court now uncritically cites Perkins for the proposition that a
corporation is subject to general jurisdiction in the state of its principal place of business.
See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 928 (2011)
(describing Perkins as “[t]he textbook case of general jurisdiction appropriately
exercised over a foreign corporation that has not consented to suit in the forum”
(quoting Donahue v. Far E. Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1981))).
However, the case is not quite so clear as the Court now interprets it. The Court’s
opinion was very close to an advisory opinion, the suit was probably related to the
corporation’s forum-state activities, and it is not clear how extensive the corporation’s
forum-state activities were relative to other locations. See Borchers, supra note 4, at 1251.
61. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
62. Id. at 411, 416. The majority held that the plaintiffs conceded in their brief
that the forum state activities were unrelated. Id. at 414. While the brief was not a model
of clarity, Justice Brennan argued in his dissent that the plaintiffs had not conceded the
issue. Id. at 426 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He noted that they could have reasonably
argued the contacts were related because one of the allegations was negligent pilot
training—the case arose out of the crash of a helicopter the defendant owned—and
at least some training had taken place in the forum state of Texas. Id. at 425–26.
63. See HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 21, at 408–13 (arguing that “the quantum
of unrelated contacts” is the most difficult aspect of the general jurisdiction analysis).
64. 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
65. See Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (finding personal
jurisdiction where defendant tire manufacturer exported and distributed a substantial
number of its tires in the forum state), rev’d sub nom. Goodyear, 564 U.S. 915 (holding
that the defendant’s connection was too limited to the forum state to serve as the basis
for general jurisdiction).
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manufactured a tire that allegedly caused a bus accident in France.66
The only contacts the subsidiaries had with the forum state were
unrelated sales of about tens of thousands (out of tens of millions) of
tires.67 To the surprise of virtually no one,68 the Court unanimously
reversed and held that minimum contacts were lacking.69 The news
out of Goodyear was that the Court announced a fresh test for corporate
general jurisdiction: the corporation must be “at home” or “essentially
at home” (the Court used both formulations) in the forum.70 In
subsequent cases, the Court made clear that it is serious about the new
test, and corporations are probably subject to general jurisdiction only
in the states of their principal place of business and incorporation.71
Coupled with an earlier suggestion that contacts-based general
jurisdiction does not apply to individuals72—thus limiting general
jurisdiction over individual defendants to traditional bases, such as

66. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 918. The Court held that Goodyear had not timely raised
the question of whether the activities of the subsidiaries could be imputed to the
parent U.S. corporation. Id. at 930–31.
67. Id. at 921.
68. See, e.g., Hoffheimer, supra note 8, at 550 n.8 (2012) (predicting the Supreme
Court’s unanimous reversal of the lower courts’ finding of jurisdiction).
69. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 929–30.
70. Id. at 919, 929.
71. See, e.g., BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017) (applying the
Goodyear and Daimler “at home” test to determine jurisdiction). While the Supreme
Court has declined to create a categorical rule that a corporation is only “at home” in
either its place of incorporation or principal place of business, cases finding a
corporation “at home” anywhere else, if they exist, are rare indeed. Id. at 1560
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[I]t is virtually inconceivable
that such corporations will ever be subject to general jurisdiction in any location other
than their principal places of business or of incorporation.”); see also Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778 (2017) (noting the California
Supreme Court’s unanimous agreement that general jurisdiction was lacking).
72. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610 n.1 (1990) (plurality
opinion). Even prior to Burnham, cases finding general jurisdiction over individuals
based on “systematic and continuous” contacts were extremely rare. See HAY, BORCHERS
& SYMEONIDES, supra note 21, at 408 (explaining that general jurisdiction over
individuals is typically based on domicile or residence, but in rare cases the individual
may have strong ties to a forum state other than where they are domiciled). It seems
likely that with the Court’s limitation of corporate general jurisdiction to the
defendant’s home that the same rule applies to individuals. Thus, general jurisdiction
would be limited to a person’s domicile or where the defendant is physically served.
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in-state service of process73 and domicile74—general jurisdiction has
become extremely limited.75
There is something to be said for reining in general jurisdiction.76 If
a large corporation like General Motors were subject to jurisdiction in
every state, its only defenses against blatant forum shopping would be
the doctrine of forum non conveniens77 and venue transfer.78 But
broader general jurisdiction sometimes acted as a safety valve to
provide plaintiffs with a reasonable forum where specific jurisdiction
would not.79 The Court should have fixed specific jurisdiction before
it went to work on general jurisdiction.
C. Intentional Torts
Intentional tort jurisdictional law was once a relatively clear spot in
the jurisdictional fog. In two cases decided the same day, Calder v.
Jones80 and Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,81 the Court held that a
plaintiff defamed by a publication could sue wherever the publication
had substantial circulation.82 In so doing, the Court announced the
“effects” test, which seemed to mean that if an intentional tort were
committed by the defendant in one state and had a predictable effect on
the plaintiff in the forum state, the defendant was subject to jurisdiction.83
Matters became less clear, however, with the Supreme Court’s
unanimous decision in Walden v. Fiore.84 In Walden, the plaintiffs were
professional gamblers returning from Puerto Rico to their home in
73. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619 (plurality opinion) (reaffirming in-state service of
process as a traditional basis for general jurisdiction).
74. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940) (finding that a defendant’s
domicile is a fair basis for general jurisdiction).
75. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1784–85 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Daimler severely limited general jurisdiction).
76. See supra note 8.
77. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249 (1981) (noting that a
court may ordinarily dismiss a case when holding the trial in the plaintiff’s chosen
forum imposes a heavy burden on the defendant or court).
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012) (allowing transfer in the interests of justice to a more
convenient federal venue).
79. See Borchers, supra note 6, at 139 (“[G]eneral jurisdiction exists as an imperfect
safety valve that sometimes allows plaintiffs access to a reasonable forum in cases when
specific jurisdiction would deny it.”).
80. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
81. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
82. Calder, 465 U.S. at 790–91; Keeton, 465 U.S. at 773–74.
83. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
84. 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).
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Nevada.85 Federal agents detained them at the Atlanta, Georgia,
airport and seized $97,000 in cash.86 After repeated demands from the
plaintiffs’ lawyer, the government eventually returned the money to
the plaintiffs in Nevada.87 The plaintiffs brought a Bivens action in a
Nevada federal court against the agent, alleging essentially a
federalized theory of trespass to chattels.88
The plaintiffs alleged that the agents knew that they were Nevadans
and argued that under the effects test, Nevada had minimum contacts
because the plaintiffs lost the right to use the money in Nevada.89 The
Supreme Court disagreed and unanimously reversed the Court of
Appeals’ grant of jurisdiction.90 In a sentence sure now to be quoted
by every defense brief on personal jurisdiction, the Court wrote:
“[O]ur ‘minimum contacts’ analysis looks to the defendant’s contacts
with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons
who reside there.”91
Although the Court tried mightily,92 the Walden decision is hard to
square with Calder and Keeton. In Walden, the Court explained that it
had found jurisdiction in Calder because the plaintiff resided in the
forum state and the defendant’s conduct affected her reputation
there.93 The Walden Court noted that in its case the government
deprived the plaintiffs of the use of the money no matter where they
were located.94 But, in Keeton, Calder’s companion case, the Court
considered it insignificant that the plaintiff had no connection to the
forum state and chose it only for its long statute of limitations.95
Realistically, the Keeton plaintiff had almost no reputation to lose in
New Hampshire because the record showed she had never been there

85. Id. at 1119.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1126.
88. Id. at 1120 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971)) (recounting the plaintiffs’ allegation that defendant was unlawfully “keeping
the money after concluding that it did not come from drug-related activity”).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1126.
91. Id. at 1122. The Supreme Court relied heavily on this concept in Bristol- Myers
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779 (2017).
92. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123–25 (distinguishing Walden from Calder and Keeton by noting
that the defendant in Walden did not direct any activity toward the state, only the plaintiff).
93. Id. at 1124 & n.7 (citing Calder, 465 U.S. 783, 788–89 (1984)).
94. Id. at 1125.
95. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775 (1984).
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before the case began,96 and the Calder defendant affected the
plaintiff’s reputation in California regardless of where the plaintiff was
located when the magazine published the article.97
Georgia may have been a better forum than Nevada for the Walden
case. But there is no constitutional rule that the plaintiff is allowed
only one forum choice. The issue is minimum contacts, not the most
significant contacts.98 If the plaintiffs were truly forum shopping and
Georgia was a more convenient forum, the federal venue transfer
statute stood ready to shift the proceedings there.99
D. The Elusive Reasonableness Test
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court created—mostly out of whole
cloth—a five-factor test for assessing the reasonableness of
jurisdictional assertions. The factors were: (1) “the burden on the
defendant”; (2) “the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the
dispute”; (3) “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and
effective relief”; (4) “the interstate judicial system’s interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies”; and (5) “the
shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies.”100 Ironically, in World-Wide Volkswagen,
those factors pointed toward the Oklahoma forum—which the Court
found could not exercise jurisdiction—because the bulk of the
evidence was there and thus certainly the most convenience for the
parties and witnesses.101
Nevertheless, the Court held that
considerations of “interstate federalism” trumped convenience and
fairness and Oklahoma’s attempted assertion of jurisdiction over the
New York dealer and distributor was unconstitutional.102

96. See id. at 779–80 (noting that most of the harm to the plaintiff happened
outside New Hampshire).
97. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 784–86 (making no mention of plaintiff’s physical
location at the time of publication of the libelous story).
98. See Susanna Felleman, Note, Ethical Dilemmas and the Multistate Lawyer: A
Proposed Amendment to the Choice-of-Law Rule in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 1500, 1525 (1995) (arguing that the minimum contacts test should
be replaced by a “most significant contacts” test).
99. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012) (allowing parties to change venue to a more
convenient forum).
100. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
101. See id. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that Oklahoma was the location
of the car accident, the plaintiff’s hospitalization, and essential witnesses and evidence).
102. Id. at 294 (majority opinion).
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The five-factor reasonableness test re-emerged in Burger King Corp.
v. Rudzewicz,103 in which the Court allowed the fast-food franchise giant
Burger King to sue a Michigan franchisee for breach of contract in the
franchisor’s home state of Florida.104 In that case, the test may have
tipped the scales in favor of jurisdiction because the Court placed
considerable emphasis on the duration and size of the contract.105
The reasonableness test then dictated the result in Asahi.106 In Asahi,
as noted above,107 the Court split four-to-four-to-one on whether
predictable and substantial resale of a product in the forum state
satisfied the stream-of-commerce test. But remarkably, eight of the
nine Justices agreed jurisdiction was unreasonable, and thus
unconstitutional, on the more general grounds embodied in the fivefactor test.108 The Court pointed to the fact that the only remaining
part of the suit was a third-party claim between the Japanese
manufacturer of the motorcycle tire valve and the Taiwanese
manufacturer of the tube-tire assembly.109 Given the ancillary nature
of the third-party action—and that no domestic party remained in the
case—the Court found jurisdiction to be unreasonable.110 This
appeared to be big news because it clearly added another step to the
constitutional test: even if the defendant had minimum contacts with
the forum state, it still might not be subject to jurisdiction.111
Then the Court seemed to forget about the reasonableness test. It
is true that every case to reach the Supreme Court since Burger King—
with one exception112—found minimum contacts lacking, thus not
requiring the majority and plurality opinions to reach the test. But
103. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
104. See id. at 468, 477.
105. Id. at 479–80.
106. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113–14 (1987)
(plurality opinion) (applying the five-factor test to determine that jurisdiction over
Asahi would be unreasonable).
107. See supra notes 42–47 and accompanying text.
108. Justice Scalia joined the opinion holding that minimum contacts were lacking
but did not offer a view one way or the other on the reasonableness test. See Asahi, 480
U.S. at 105 (setting forth the votes of each Justice).
109. Id. at 114 (plurality opinion).
110. Id. at 113–14.
111. The Asahi reasonableness dismissal and the doctrine of forum non conveniens
share some similarities, but the Court’s forum non conveniens decisions are a separate
line of cases. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
112. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). However, only Justice
Brennan, writing for himself and three other Justices, engaged in a minimum contacts
analysis. Id. at 637–39 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
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given that the reasonableness test was the basis for the holding in Asahi,
it seems strange that the Court did not address the test’s five factors as
alternative grounds for finding no jurisdiction or at least mention
them. Moreover, two extensive opinions—one a concurrence in the
judgment113 and the other a dissent114—concluded that there was
jurisdiction but made no serious effort to apply the five-factor test and
discussed only minimum contacts. The reasonableness test earned a
brief mention in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in J. McIntyre, but she did
not address it at any length even though she argued that jurisdiction
was constitutional.115 In Burnham v. Superior Court,116 a case reaffirming
in-state service of process as a basis for jurisdiction over individual
defendants, Justice Brennan engaged in a minimum contacts analysis in
his concurrence in the judgment but did not mention the reasonableness
test, even though Asahi had been decided just three years earlier.117
The Supreme Court finally addressed the reasonableness test’s
applicability to general jurisdiction in Daimler. Justice Ginsburg’s
opinion, which garnered eight votes, held that the auto giant DaimlerChrysler was not at home in California, even though it had significant
contacts—dealerships and the like—in the forum state.118 The
majority engaged in what Justice Sotomayor termed, in her
concurrence in the judgment, a proportionality test with regard to
contacts.119 Why is it, she wondered, having greater out-of-state
contacts should count against jurisdiction if the in-state contacts were
substantial enough to make the assertion of jurisdiction fair?120 Justice
Sotomayor, however, concurred in the judgment because, in her view,
the mostly foreign nature of the events and parties made jurisdiction
unreasonable under the five-factor test.121 This earned a rebuke from
Justice Ginsburg who stated that reasonableness analysis is

113. Id.
114. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 907–09 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
115. Id. Justice Ginsburg cited Asahi and referred to fairness considerations but did
not explicitly engage in a two-step analysis. See id. at 908.
116. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
117. Id. at 637–39 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
118. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014).
119. See id. at 772 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
120. Id. at 764 (“The problem, the Court says, is not that Daimler’s contacts with
California are too few, but that its contacts with other forums are too many.”).
121. Id. at 765.
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“superfluous” in general jurisdiction cases and applicable only in
specific jurisdiction cases.122
But if the reasonableness test is applicable in specific jurisdiction
cases, why did Justice Ginsburg not explicitly address it in her
J. McIntyre dissent? She would have found that the defendant was
subject to jurisdiction,123 so if specific jurisdiction requires satisfaction
of both the minimum contacts and the five-factor reasonableness test,
she ought to have discussed both. To really know whether the Court
is serious about the reasonableness test will require a specific
jurisdiction case in which the Court finds that there are minimum
contacts. The last case to do so unambiguously was the 1985 decision
in Burger King,124 so it might be a long wait.
The reasonableness test got barely a nod from the Supreme Court
majority in its recent opinion in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior
Court.125 The majority found that the claims of the non-resident
plaintiffs lacked specific jurisdiction because the contacts were not
related to their claims.126 Justice Sotomayor, who would have found
specific jurisdiction, addressed it directly in her dissent.127 It thus
might be that she is the only Justice serious about the test.
E. What Counts as a Related Contact?
Particularly with the contraction of general jurisdiction, the question
of what counts as a related contact is more important than ever because
unrelated contacts are worthless to the plaintiff unless, in the case of
corporations, they amount to a business’s headquarters or state of
incorporation. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not said much
of use on the topic.

122. Id. at 762 n.20 (majority opinion).
123. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 907–10 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
124. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985). One might make
a case for the Supreme Court’s 1987 decision in Asahi, as Justice Steven’s concurrence in
the judgment would have found minimum contacts based on the volume of valves sold in
the forum state. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 121–22 (1987)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
125. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
126. Id. at 1781 (“[T]he nonresidents were not prescribed Plavix in California, did
not purchase Plavix in California, did not ingest Plavix in California, and were not
injured by Plavix in California.”).
127. Id. at 1786–87 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is no serious doubt that
the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims is reasonable.”).
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As I have argued elsewhere, I do not believe that the International
Shoe Court thought it was writing a landmark decision.128 Rather, the
problem was that common-law concepts of jurisdiction, based
principally on power over tangible things such as real property and
people, did not fit well with corporations.129 The International Shoe Court
faced two practical and pressing issues. The first was that jurisdiction over
corporations was being rationalized in two distinct lines of cases. One line
concerned whether the corporation was “present” in the forum (an effort
to analogize to the physical presence of a person for purposes of service
of process), and the other concerned whether the corporation’s
business in the forum was sufficient to support the fiction that it
implicitly consented to jurisdiction.130
The other practical problem was that, at the time, courts thought
“mere solicitation” of businesses in the forum was insufficient to
support jurisdiction, but solicitation plus other activities sufficed.131 It
seems likely that the International Shoe Co.’s odd business model of
giving its sales force only one of a pair of shoes as demonstrators and
requiring a customer to order the pair through its Missouri office was
an effort to bring it within the definition of mere solicitation.132
The International Shoe Court erased the line between mere
solicitation and solicitation plus by bringing both within the rubric of
minimum contacts. The term minimum contacts also brought together
the presence and implied consent cases, at least for corporations,
under one analytical roof.133 What the Justices seem to have

128. See Borchers, supra note 5, at 14, 28 (explaining that International Shoe was a
“fairly easy case” under the then-existing standards, and “[i]t is far from clear that the
International Shoe Court meant to offer a grand unifying theory of judicial jurisdiction”).
129. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“[I]t is
clear that unlike an individual[, a corporation’s] ‘presence’ without, as well as within,
the state of its origin can be manifested only by activities carried on in its behalf by
those who are authorized to act for it.”).
130. Id. at 314–15.
131. Id. at 315. It is difficult to miss the parallel to the current conundrum of
whether resale alone or resale plus other activities is needed to support jurisdiction in
products liability cases. See supra notes 42–56 and accompanying text.
132. See Borchers, supra note 5, at 28 (stating that International Shoe Co. likely used
its business model to avoid jurisdiction).
133. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318; see also Erin F. Norris, Note, Why the Internet
Isn’t Special: Restoring Predictability to Personal Jurisdiction, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1013, 1019
(2011) (explaining the use of the fictions of “presence” and “consent” to support
jurisdiction and how the theories eventually merged to cover corporations that were
“doing business” within a forum state).
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forgotten—except for Justice Sotomayor134—is that International Shoe is
an opinion couched in terms of fairness to the parties and had not
even the faintest odor of sovereignty. The Court stated “due process
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, . . . he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.”135
The decision is also couched in
reasonableness terms, such as that due process requires only that “the
state of the forum . . . make it reasonable . . . to require the
corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.”136
The general-specific dichotomy arose from mostly dictum in
International Shoe. The Court stated: “‘Presence’ in the state in this sense
has never been doubted when the activities of the corporation there
have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the
liabilities sued on . . . .”137 The Court viewed this approach as being
the simplest case for jurisdiction as the cause of action arose from the
forum-state activities, and apparently the Court viewed the case itself
as easy because the dispute was about whether the corporation owed
the state funds for unemployment compensation for the salesman.138
The Court then described the straightforward case for not finding
jurisdiction: “Conversely it has been generally recognized that the
casual presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or
isolated items of activities in a state in the corporation’s behalf are not
enough to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected with the
activities there.”139
Then came the sentence that launched general jurisdiction:
“[T]here have been instances in which the continuous corporate
operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a
nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from
To Justice
dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”140
Sotomayor’s point regarding the radical contraction of general

134. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1788 (2017)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s animating concern . . . appears to be
federalism . . . .”).
135. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (internal quotations omitted).
136. Id. at 317.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 320 (finding the activities carried out in the forum state to be neither
irregular or casual).
139. Id. at 317.
140. Id. at 318.
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jurisdiction to a defendant’s home, the International Shoe Court viewed
having a dozen salesmen and doing $30,000 a year of business in the
forum as continuous and systematic contacts,141 which is a far cry from
the forum state being the defendant’s home.
Next came the sentence that launched specific jurisdiction: “[Some
isolated contacts,] because of their nature and quality and the
circumstances of their commission, may be deemed sufficient to
render the corporation liable to suit.”142 In context, the Court here
was clearly referring to forum contacts related to the suit. Note,
however, that the International Shoe Court used the terms “related,”
“connected,” and “arising from” as if they were synonyms.143
Semantically, the words “related” and “connected” connote a weaker
relationship than “arising from.”144 “Arising from”—in ordinary
usage—implies that nearly all the events giving rise to the suit took
place in the forum.145 “Related” or “connected” implies that the
contacts were part of a chain of events leading to the claim or at least
connected with those events, but not necessarily the basis for liability
itself.146 There are easy cases in which the contacts clearly qualify for
specific jurisdiction under any formulation. In one of the few postInternational Shoe decisions to find specific jurisdiction, McGee v.
International Life Insurance Co.,147 the plaintiff sued for recovery on a life
insurance policy sold in the forum to a forum resident.148 On any
theory, the cause of action was related to, connected with, and arose
from the forum contacts.149 Similarly, there are obvious cases of
unrelated contacts. In Goodyear, the tires sold in the forum state by the
defendant were not the ones that caused the injury.150 Thus the
defendant’s activities in the forum did not bear even the most tenuous
connection to the cause of action.
141. Id. at 320.
142. Id. at 318.
143. Id. at 318–20 (using all three terms to delineate the sufficient level of contact
to establish jurisdiction).
144. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 425 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (declaring a “substantial difference” between the two standards).
145. See id. (stating that the court neglected to acknowledge this difference).
146. See id. (“[T]he wrongful-death claim filed by the respondents is significantly
related to the undisputed contacts between Helicol and the forum.”).
147. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
148. Id. at 221–22.
149. See id. at 223 (holding that the suit was based on a contract that had a
substantial connection with the forum state).
150. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).
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But intermediate cases are dividing the lower courts. Many cases
follow what one might call the “vacation fact pattern.” The defendant
advertises in the resident’s forum state, and the forum resident decides
to take a vacation, trip, or cruise out of state. The forum resident is
injured and returns home to sue.151 Are the forum state contacts
sufficiently close to the cause of action to be treated as related contacts
for specific jurisdiction purposes? On the one hand, the plaintiff would
never have experienced an injury but for the defendant’s intentional
efforts to take advantage of the forum-state market. On the other
hand, few—if any—of the liability-creating events took place in the forum.
Lower courts have staked out two major camps. The minority uses
the “but for” test.152 Under it, if the forum-state events have a causal
relationship to the liability creating events, then the contacts are
related.153 In the vacation cases, if advertising in the forum lures the
plaintiff out of state to the location where the accident took place, it is
a specific jurisdiction case.154
A bevy of alternatives are applied elsewhere: the “substantive
relevance” test,155 the “proximate cause” test,156 the “substantial
connection to operative facts” test,157 and so on. While these
alternatives may have slight differences, they share the same basic
feature of rejecting the but for test’s minimal requirement of a causal
relationship. Instead, these tests demand that some or all of the

151. See, e.g., Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 573 (Tex. 2007)
(holding that a travel company did not have sufficient contacts with the forum state in
which it advertised in a wrongful death action regarding a child’s hiking death).
152. See, e.g., Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir. 1990)
(explaining that the “but for” test is similar, in its basic function, to the “arising out of”
test), rev’d on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
153. Id.
154. See id. at 386 (finding that Carnival’s “forum-related” activities induced the
plaintiff to take the cruise that precipitated her injury).
155. See, e.g., Tecre Co. v. Buttonpro, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 927, 933 (E.D. Wis. 2005)
(citing Marino v. Hyatt Corp., 793 F.2d 427, 430 (1st Cir. 1990)) (noting that the
substantive relevance test requires that “the forum contacts must be necessary to the
proof of the cause of action”).
156. This test is analogous to the common law tort rule of causation, requiring but
for causation, and proximate cause between the forum contacts and the cause of
action. See, e.g., United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp.,
960 F.2d 1080, 1089 (1st Cir. 1992); Pearrow v. Nat’l Life & Accident Ins. Co., 703 F.2d
1067, 1068–69 (8th Cir. 1983).
157. Here, courts require the cause of action to “lie in the wake of” the commercial
activity in the forum. See, e.g., Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569,
584 (Tex. 2007).
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liability-creating events take place in the forum state for the case to be
one of specific jurisdiction.158
The Supreme Court has done a masterful job of ducking the issue.
In Helicopteros Nacionales, at least some of the events giving rise to
liability may have taken place in the forum state of Texas.159 One of
the allegations was that negligent pilot training led to the helicopter
crash in South America, and at least some training took place in
Texas.160 The majority, however, held that the plaintiffs had conceded
a lack of relatedness and thus avoided specific jurisdiction analysis.161
Justice Brennan’s solo dissent did not read the plaintiffs’ brief as
conceding the issue.162 He noted the different formulations in
International Shoe and argued that liability strictly arising from the contacts
was not a constitutional requirement for specific jurisdiction.163
In the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.,164
the facts fit the quintessential vacation case with the defendant’s inforum advertising inducing the plaintiff to take a cruise outside of
Washington—the forum state and her home.165 The plaintiff slipped
and fell on the deck of the cruise ship, sustaining an injury, while the
ship was at sea.166 The back of her ticket, however, contained a clause
limiting the forum to Florida.167 The Ninth Circuit held the forumselection clause unenforceable on unconscionability grounds and,
applying the but for test, ruled that the defendant’s in-forum
advertising efforts were related contacts because they were part of the
sequence of events leading to the accident.168 The Supreme Court,

158. See, e.g., Marino, 793 F.2d at 430; Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 588.
159. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 410–11
(1984) (noting that the petitioner negotiated the contract in Texas, purchased goods
from Texas, and sent pilots and management to Texas for training).
160. Id. at 411.
161. Id. at 415.
162. Id. at 425 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 425, 427 (“[A] court’s specific jurisdiction should be applicable whenever
the cause of action arises out of or relates to the contacts between the defendant and
the forum.” (emphasis added)).
164. 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
165. Id. at 379.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 386, 388–89 (noting that the defendant solicited the plaintiffs in
Washington, and declining to enforce the forum-selection provision of the ticket
because it was not freely bargained for).
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however, ruled the forum-selection clause enforceable and never
reached the question of whether the contacts were related.169
The Supreme Court addressed, in passing, the relatedness of
contacts in its recent opinion in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.170 In that case,
about 600 plaintiffs from thirty-four states brought an action in
California state court alleging that the defendant’s blood-thinning
drug Plavix injured them.171 All of the Justices agreed that general
jurisdiction was lacking because the defendant’s principal place of
business was in New York and it was incorporated in Delaware.172
About ninety of the plaintiffs were California residents; as to
jurisdiction over their claims, there was no dispute because they had
been prescribed the pill and ingested it in California.173 But as to the
non-California-resident plaintiffs, the Court found specific jurisdiction
lacking because the only relationship between their suits and
California was that they had engaged in similar conduct—being
prescribed and ingesting the pills—in their home states as a result of a
national campaign to market Plavix.174 The eight-vote majority opinion
shed no light on whether it viewed “arising from,” “related to,” and
“connected with” as setting any different standard in the relationship of
the contacts for specific jurisdiction purposes because in the majority’s
view, parallel conduct could not suffice under any theory.175
Justice Sotomayor dissented. She viewed the contacts as related
because of the national reach of the defendant and because California
was home to a company that had marketed Plavix.176 She also pointed
out the efficiency of having the essentially identical cases heard in one
forum instead of thirty-four.177

169. See Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 589 (“Because we find the forum-selection clause
to be dispositive of this question, we need not consider petitioner’s constitutional
argument as to personal jurisdiction.”).
170. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017).
171. Id. at 1778.
172. See id. at 1778–79 (noting that the issue of general jurisdiction was properly
decided by the lower court); see also id. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (agreeing
that the case lacked general jurisdiction).
173. Id. at 1782 (majority opinion) (considering claim of lack of specific jurisdiction
only as to non-resident plaintiffs).
174. Id. at 1783.
175. Id. at 1782 (“[A]ll the conduct giving rise to the nonresidents’ claims occurred
elsewhere.”).
176. Id. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that materially identical
conduct in non-forum state constitutes a connected contact).
177. Id. at 1787.
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Bristol-Myers shines little light on what counts as a related contact.
The California Supreme Court’s and Justice Sotomayor’s view—that
parallel conduct outside the forum state is sufficiently connected to
count as a related contact—goes well beyond even the liberal but for
test. As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court majority dismissed it with a
wave of the hand, giving no hint as to how it would approach a vacation
case or similar fact pattern.178
F. Virtual Contacts
All of the Supreme Court’s decisions, including the recent ones, are
decidedly old school. They have involved things such as industrial
machines sold at trade shows,179 injuries working on a railroad,180 tire
Justice Stephen Breyer’s controlling
blowouts,181 and so on.
concurrence in the judgment in J. McIntyre expressly addressed the
possibility that the calculus might change if a case involved a product
marketed and sold through a large online distributor such as
Amazon.182 The possibility that virtual contacts might raise different
considerations earned a brief mention in Walden.183 But these asides
give lower courts no guidance.
Showing how desperate lower courts are for some path markers, in
vast numbers they latched onto the Western District of Pennsylvania
case of Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.184 Zippo, an
Internet trademark infringement dispute between two companies both
using the word “Zippo,” proposed a sliding scale from highly
interactive web sites to purely passive ones, the latter being essentially

178. See id. at 1781–82 (reasoning that no connection existed between the forum
state, California, and the claims non-residents brought in California for incidents
occurring outside the state because the plaintiffs were not California residents and had
not been harmed by conduct in California).
179. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 878 (2011) (plurality
opinion).
180. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1553–54 (2017).
181. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 920
(2011); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 106 (1987) (plurality
opinion).
182. See J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. 880 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)
(questioning the extent of the majority’s holding in cases where a company “targets
the world” through internet advertising and sales).
183. See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 n.9 (2014) (describing “virtual
contacts” as a difficult question best left “for another day”).
184. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
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billboards on the Internet.185 The higher the level of interactivity, the
greater the chance of establishing jurisdiction.186 Zippo will go down in
history as one of the most frequently cited district court cases.187
While Zippo was an admirable effort to bring order to the chaos, two
decades hence its sliding scale is obsolete.188 Even the humblest blogs
are interactive in the sense that readers can post comments and email
the blogger. Big distributors like Amazon have achieved a level of
interactivity unimaginable when Zippo was written.189 Not only can one
search and compare items for purchase, based on one’s past usage,
such sites will suggest purchases and remind you of relatives’ birthdays,
to say nothing of gift-giving holidays. So-called “Cyber Monday” has
begun to rival “Black Friday” in sales.190 Thus, critical issues are
unresolved in common fact patterns. Vast numbers of online
purchases are made through highly interactive sites, yet it is not clear
whether this means that the consumer should always be able to sue at
home regarding a dispute involving the purchase.
Another confused area is internet libel. Even the most passive of
websites can convey a poisonous message visible to anyone with
unfiltered access to the internet.191 In particular, the Court’s decision
in Keeton suggests that libel plaintiffs should be able to sue wherever
the allegedly libelous message appears, given that the defendant in that

185. Id. at 1124.
186. See id. at 1124–25 (reasoning that the more interactive a web site is, the more
the website owner’s conduct amounts to purposeful availment).
187. A 2017 Lexis search showed that federal courts had cited Zippo over 1000 times
and state courts had cited the decision over 100 times. The frequency with which
courts cited the case peaked around 2005, but recent cases still follow the decision.
See, e.g., Bell v. Moawad Grp., LLC, No. A-17-CA-00073-SS, 2017 WL 2841679, at *4
(W.D. Tex. June 30, 2017).
188. To its credit, the Zippo court described e-commerce as being in its “infant
stages.” Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1123. Thus, it seems doubtful that the Zippo court
imagined its opinion would exert influence twenty years later.
189. Id. at 1124 (describing the highest level of interactivity at that time as when
“the defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve
the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet”).
190. See Charisse Jones, Cyber Monday Smashes Online Sales Record, USA TODAY (Nov.
29, 2016, 12:42 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2016/11/28/cybermonday-set-top-last-year-sales/94552948 (discussing a Cyber Monday sales record of
$3.45 billion and a trend toward online purchasing even on Black Friday).
191. See Patrick J. Borchers, Internet Libel: The Consequences of a Non-Rule Approach to
Personal Jurisdiction, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 473, 480 (2004) (explaining that distinguishing
between web-based and print-based libel may be difficult to justify).
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case sold only a small percentage of its magazines in the forum state.192
But many courts have resisted this result, demanding instead that the
libelous communication target the state, a showing often dependent
on whether the communication makes specific reference to the state
and so on.193 As a result, lower courts are badly split on whether
internet libel plaintiffs can sue at home or not.194
II. THE PROPOSAL
In most cases, federal courts have the same territorial reach as their
state court counterparts. Such has been the law for over half a
century.195 Currently this rule is contained in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(k)(1)(A), which provides that federal courts have personal
jurisdiction if the defendant “is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of
general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located.”196
So, as a general proposition, a federal court in Nebraska has the same
territorial reach as a state court in Nebraska, and so on for all states.
All states have enacted what are commonly known as long-arm
statutes.197 With respect to common law bases of jurisdiction—such as
192. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 772–73, 779–81 (1984)
(permitting personal jurisdiction in a libel suit in New Hampshire even though “the
bulk of the harm done to petitioner occurred outside New Hampshire” because the
magazine had “continuously and deliberately exploited the New Hampshire market”);
see also Borchers, supra note 191, at 480 (asserting that courts should treat personal
jurisdiction in cases of libel on “passive” websites the same as cases of libel in physical
publications because the resultant harm is equivalent).
193. See, e.g., Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 258–59 (4th Cir. 2002)
(“[A] court in Virginia cannot constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over the
Connecticut-based newspaper defendants because they did not manifest an intent to
aim their websites or the posted articles at a Virginia audience.”); Griffis v. Luban, 646
N.W.2d 527, 535 (Minn. 2002) (“While . . . Luban’s statements were intentionally
directed at Griffis, whom she knew to be an Alabama resident . . . nothing in the record
indicates that the statements were targeted at the state of Alabama or at an Alabama
audience beyond Griffis herself.”); see also Borchers, supra note 191, at 473, 486–87
(discussing cases seemingly inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Keeton).
194. See Borchers, supra note 191, at 482 (identifying thirty-two post-Keeton reported
decisions on internet libel jurisdiction, with thirteen concluding jurisdiction existed
and nineteen concluding jurisdiction did not exist).
195. See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. United Press Int’l, 320 F.2d 219, 226, 231 (2d Cir. 1963)
(en banc) (finding no reason for federal courts to override an applicable state law in
a diversity jurisdiction case).
196. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
197. See Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Statutes Extended to
the Limits of Due Process, 84 B.U. L. REV. 491, 496–97 (2004) (elaborating that seven states
have long-arm statutes “extend[ing] the state’s jurisdiction to the limits of due process,”
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in-forum service of an individual or voluntary appearance—the
common law provides the state with affirmative authority to assert
jurisdiction, and such assertions are constitutional.198 Consequently,
about a century ago, states began pushing the common law’s
jurisdictional bounds with statutes. Most prominent among these were
non-resident motorist statutes. These statutes appointed a state official
as the agent for service of process for non-residents based on the
fiction that, by using a state’s roads, an out-of-state motorist implicitly
consented to jurisdiction over auto accident suits in that state.199 The
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of these statutes as long as
they required reasonable notice to the non-resident, usually by having
the state official mail the complaint and summons.200
After
International Shoe, states began to enact more expansive general statutes
to assert jurisdiction over all types of civil cases, hence the colloquial
name long-arm statutes.201
These statutes fall into two broad categories. Some, such as
California’s, give their courts all of the jurisdiction that the
Constitution allows.202 Others, such as New York’s, are detailed and
provide jurisdiction on specific bases, such as over any person who
“transacts business within the state.”203 While in some cases the latter
stop short of the constitutional line, they cannot go beyond
constitutional limits.204 As a result, the Fourteenth Amendment’s

thirty states have long-arm statutes enumerating acts that subject a nonresident to the state’s
jurisdiction, and thirteen states have a hybrid of the two models).
198. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 301 (McKinney 2010) (incorporating expressly common
law bases of jurisdiction); see also Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 612, 615,
619 (1990) (plurality opinion) (reaffirming the common law basis of in-state service).
199. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) (expanding the personal
jurisdiction doctrine by condoning Massachusetts’s novel theory of implied consent
for out-of-state motorists).
200. See id. at 354, 356 (noting requirement of notice by mail in upholding the
statute); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 18–19 (1928) (striking down a statute with
no express requirement of notice even though notice was given).
201. See McFarland, supra note 197, at 492–96 (discussing how International Shoe
transformed the law of personal jurisdiction by authorizing service on non-residents
outside the forum state).
202. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2004) (providing that California courts
have jurisdiction “on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution”).
203. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(1).
204. See McFarland, supra note 197, at 492–93 (explaining that states can exercise
personal jurisdiction over non-residents only if the jurisdiction comports with the
Fourteenth Amendment-derived “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice” (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
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requirement of minimum contacts with the forum applies indirectly to
federal courts, even though as organs of the federal government they
normally would be subject to the Fifth Amendment. Thus, the
Supreme Court has treated cases brought in federal court as if they had
been brought in state court.205
Rule 4(k)(1) contains two exceptions purporting to give federal
courts broader reach, however. One of long standing, which has
launched thousands of Civil Procedure multiple-choice exam
questions, is the “bulge rule.”206 The bulge rule provides that a
supplemental party brought in by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 14
or 19 is subject to service of process within 100 miles (as the crow
flies207) of the federal courthouse, if the service takes place in the
United States.208 It is clear from the rule that the physical act of service
must take place in the “bulge area,” which can cover multiple states for
many federal courthouses.
Courts have proposed three readings of the bulge rule. One is that
the rule confers no extra-jurisdictional reach but merely authorizes
delivery of the summons and complaint outside the forum state.209
That reading, however, would render the rule meaningless, as the
combination of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 and state statutes
that Rule 4 incorporates authorize delivery of the summons and
complaint outside the forum state.210 Courts are divided as to whether
a party brought in by the bulge rule must have minimum contacts with
the bulge area or with the “bulge state,” or the state where service took
place.211 However, under either interpretation the federal courts have
modestly broader jurisdictional reach than their state court counterparts.
205. See, e.g., Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 463–64 (1985).
206. The bulge rule was adopted in 1963. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY
KANE, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 451 (7th ed. 2011).
207. See Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 1979) (concluding
that the proper way to measure the bulge area is to use straight-line air miles, “as the
crow flies,” instead of road miles).
208. HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 21, at 487.
209. See, e.g., Coleman v. Am. Exp. Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d 250, 251 (2d
Cir. 1968) (involving a Pennsylvania corporation served with a summons for the
Southern District of New York pursuant to the bulge rule despite its conducting no
business in New York).
210. See id. at 251–52 (explaining that most states had already provided for out-ofstate process via long-arm statutes, which federal courts could also utilize).
211. HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 21, at 487 (noting that the view that
“the defendant must have minimum contacts with the ‘bulge’ area itself” is more
common). Compare Quinones v. Pa. Gen. Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1167, 1174 (10th Cir. 1986)
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The other Rule 4(k)(1) extension recognizes that Congress has
enacted several statutes allowing nationwide service of process or using
similar language.212 As discussed more thoroughly below, lower federal
courts have generally construed the constitutional requirement to be
one of minimum contacts with the United States as a whole, not
minimum contacts with the forum state.213 Although dictum, the
plurality opinion in J. McIntyre suggested that a national contacts test
would apply to a federal statute giving the federal courts national reach
in products liability cases.214
One of the best known examples of such a statute is the federal
interpleader statute.215 Interpleader allows the holder of a stake
(commonly the proceeds of an insurance policy) to interplead rival
claimants to the stake in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits and the
possibility of multiple liability.216 However, for this to be effective, the
stakeholder needs to be able to bring all of the rival claimants to one
forum, which would be impossible if the stakeholder could not get
jurisdiction over all of them. Without any fuss, federal courts have
assumed that the grant of nationwide jurisdiction here is constitutional.217
This brings us to the other major extension, which is Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2). Rule 4(k)(2) was drafted in response to
the Supreme Court’s decision Omni Capital International, Ltd. v. Rudolf
Wolff & Co.218 The District Court determined that Louisiana’s longarm statute did not reach the defendants and dismissed the claims
(favoring the rule that a district court may exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state
party with minimum contacts within the 100-mile bulge area), with Coleman, 405 F.2d
at 252–53 (holding that a district court may exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state
party who has minimum contacts “with the state of service”).
212. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 22, 78aa (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (2012); 29 U.S.C. §
1132(e)(2) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 9613(P) (2012); see also HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES,
supra note 21, at 480 n.6 (collecting statutes).
213. See HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 21, at 480–84 (relating how equivocal
Supreme Court decisions led lower federal courts to construe the constitutional
requirement as one of minimum contacts with the United States as a whole).
214. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884–85 (2011) (plurality
opinion) (“For jurisdiction, a litigant may have the requisite relationship with the
United States Government but not with the government of any individual State. That
would be an exceptional case . . . . It may be that . . . the Congress could authorize the
exercise of jurisdiction in appropriate courts. That circumstance is not presented in
this case . . . .”).
215. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (2012).
216. See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 206, at 531–32.
217. See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. United Press Int’l, 320 F.2d 219, 229 (2d Cir. 1963) (en banc).
218. 484 U.S. 97 (1987).
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against them.219 The case was brought on a federal question theory.220
A sharply divided Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, agreed with the District
Court that the state statute applied, while the dissent opined that the
result amounted to a “bizarre hiatus in the Rules.”221 The Supreme
Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s en banc ruling, holding that the
predecessor of Rule 4(k)(1)(A) meant what it said: if the Louisiana
state courts would not have jurisdiction, then neither would a federal
court situated in Louisiana.222 But along the way, the Court mentioned
the possibility of amending the Federal Rules.223
The Omni Capital decision spawned Rule 4(k)(2).224 Rule 4(k)(2)
provides that, if the case is one “aris[ing] under federal law,” federal
courts have personal jurisdiction to the constitutional limit provided
that no state could exercise jurisdiction.225 Because Rule 4(k)(2) is
directed at federal courts, the relevant provision of the Constitution is
the Fifth Amendment.226 Both the Advisory Committee on Rules of
Civil Procedure (Rules Advisory Committee) report and most federal
courts applying Rule 4(k)(2) have adopted some version of the
national contacts test.227
My proposal is simple. Rule 4(k)(2) should be amended by adding
“or cases in which jurisdiction is based on Section 1332 of Title 28,”

219. Id. at 101–02.
220. Id. at 100.
221. See Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd., 795 F.2d 415, 419 (5th Cir.
1986) (per curiam), aff’d, 484 U.S. 97; id. at 427–28 (Wisdom, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
222. Omni Capital, 484 U.S. at 108 (relying on then-Rule 4(e)).
223. Id. at 111 (“A narrowly tailored service of process provision, authorizing service
on an alien in a federal-question case when the alien is not amenable to service under
the applicable state long-arm statute, might well serve the ends of . . . federal statutes.
It is not for the federal courts, however, to create such a rule as a matter of common
law. That responsibility . . . better rests with those who propose the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and with Congress.”).
224. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k), advisory committee’s notes to 1993 amendment
(recounting that the amended Rule 4(k) “corrects a gap in the enforcement of federal
law . . . respond[ing] to the suggestion of the Supreme Court made in [Omni Capital]”).
225. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2).
226. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k), advisory committee’s notes to 1993 amendment
(elaborating that “[t]he Fifth Amendment requires that any defendant have affiliating
contacts with the United States sufficient to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over that party”).
227. See id. (indicating that one of two versions of the national contacts test apply
under the Fifth Amendment); HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 21, at 480–84
(explaining that lower courts have used the three different national contacts tests).
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which is the diversity and alienage statute, immediately after the words
“under federal law” in the first sentence of the rule.
III. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND OBJECTIONS
Of course, no solutions to problems as intractable as those presented
by personal jurisdiction law will either be perfect or immune from legal
challenge. In this Part, I consider some of the limitations of, and
possible challenges to, my proposal.
A. How Much Would the Extended Rule 4(k)(2) Accomplish?
An extended Rule 4(k)(2) would not affect cases like World-Wide
Volkswagen and Bristol-Myers in which alternative state courts were
available to the plaintiffs. In World-Wide Volkswagen and Bristol-Myers,
the plaintiffs instead could have sued the dismissed defendants in New
York state court.
An extended rule would, however, affect cases like J. McIntyre,
assuming courts employ a national contacts test. The J. McIntyre
plurality (and to a lesser degree, the concurrence in the judgment)
made much of the fact that the defendant had not targeted New Jersey
specifically.228 There was, however, evidence in abundance that the
defendant was targeting the U.S. market.229 The plurality opinion,
228. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 873, 886 (2011) (plurality
opinion) (declaring that a British scrap metal company did not have sufficient
purposeful contacts with New Jersey because the company sold its products through a
U.S. distributor; sent representatives to trade shows in several states other than New
Jersey; had provided only four machines that ended up in New Jersey; and, in New
Jersey, had no offices or employees, paid no taxes, owned no property, and did not
advertise); id. at 888 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing that the British
company did not have sufficient contacts with New Jersey because the company wanted
its U.S. distributor to sell its products indiscriminately to any willing purchaser in
America; because the company’s representatives had attended trade shows in several
U.S. cities, but not any in New Jersey; and because the U.S. distributor only once sold
and shipped a machine to a New Jersey customer).
229. Id. at 896–97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (pointing out that McIntyre UK’s
president attended annual scrap recycling industry conventions across the United
States; McIntyre UK exhibited its product at trade shows with the intention of reaching
people across the United States; a McIntyre UK engineer had installed the company’s
equipment in several states; until 2001, McIntyre UK distributed its products
exclusively through an independent, Ohio-based company; in a letter to the
independent distributor’s president, “McIntyre UK’s president spoke plainly about the
manufacturer’s objective in authorizing the exclusive distributorship: ‘All we wish to
do is sell our products in the [United] States—and get paid!’”; when the independent
distributor was worried about U.S. litigation over McIntyre UK products, McIntyre UK
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which concluded there was no jurisdiction, did not quarrel with the
assertion that the British company had been targeting the domestic
U.S. market.230 A letter from the defendant’s corporate officers,
quoted by Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, made it obvious that the
corporation was trying to profit maximally from the U.S. market.231
An extension of Rule 4(k)(2) to diversity and alienage cases would
cure the worst of the worst cases, in which a foreign corporate
defendant purposefully and substantially benefits from the U.S. market
but is immunized from suit in any U.S. court arising from those
U.S. activities. Whatever one thinks about the merits of not allowing
the World-Wide Volkswagen, Walden, or Bristol-Myers plaintiffs to sue in
the U.S. forum of their choice, they had other U.S. forums available.
But Mr. Nicastro, the J. McIntyre plaintiff, had no U.S. forum. His only
option would be a suit in England, which likely would have been an
impracticable pursuit.232
“reassured its distributor that ‘the product was built and designed by McIntyre
Machinery in the UK and the buck stops here—if there’s something wrong with the
machine’”; the independent distributor sought guidance from McIntyre UK when
promoting McIntyre UK’s products at conventions; and McIntyre UK had been named
as a defendant in several states (citations omitted)).
230. Id. at 885 (plurality opinion) (“In this case, petitioner directed marketing and
sales efforts at the United States.”).
231. Id. at 897 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg was also appropriately
offended by the plurality’s implicit endorsement of a foreign manufacturer being able
to “Pilate-like” wash its hands of liability for a product by passing it through a nominally
independent distributor. Id. at 893–94 (“Inconceivable as it may have seemed yesterday,
the splintered majority today ‘turn[s] the clock back to the days before modern long-arm
statutes when a manufacturer, to avoid being haled into court where a user is injured,
need only Pilate-like wash its hands of a product by having independent distributors
market it.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the
Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531, 555 (1995))).
232. England now allows contingency fees but retains the “loser pays” rule, so if Mr.
Nicastro were to lose he would be liable for the defense’s attorney’s fees. See Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, Contingency Fees in England After April 2013,
LEXOLOGY, (Oct. 24, 2012), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=
f053e1a5-6992-4ef0-a9d8-9bef404a85e6. By one estimate, tort recoveries in the United
States are roughly ten times those in England. See P.S. Atiyah, Tort Law and the
Alternatives: Some Anglo-American Comparisons, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1002, 1012. Thus, even
if Mr. Nicastro’s lawyers had been able to foresee the jurisdictional dismissal, it seems
unlikely that they would have seen it as a viable proposition to find an English lawyer
and sue there. Moreover, Mr. Nicastro was injured on October 11, 2001. See Nicastro
v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 945 A.2d 92, 96 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008), aff’d,
987 A.2d 575 (N.J. 2010), rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. 873. The statute of
limitations in England for personal injuries resulting from negligence is three years
from discovery of the injury, or six years from the injury, whichever is later, subject to
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The revised Rule 4(k)(2) also will not clear up, in domestic cases
anyway, troublesome issues such as whether a contact is related or the
weight of virtual contacts. Those issues will have to be resolved by the
Supreme Court, I hope in a sensible fashion.233 But, at the very least,
it would end the absurdity of the Mr. Nicastros of the world having no
U.S. remedy except what modest amount they might get in a workers’
compensation forum.
I agree with Professor Sachs that a federal statute dealing in a
sensible way with all or most of the messy jurisdictional issues would be
better, in theory, than extending Rule 4(k)(2).234 But the statutory
solution will not come to pass. As Professor Sachs notes, in 2009, the
Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act (FMLAA) was
introduced in the House with multiple versions submitted in
subsequent Congresses.235 Every iteration of it has failed to advance.236
The bill is reminiscent of the old implied consent statutes in that, via
federal regulatory agencies, it would require foreign companies to
appoint agents for service of process and then would deem that
appointment consent to personal jurisdiction in the state where the
agent is located.237 As Professor Sachs notes, groups supportive of tort
plaintiffs endorsed the bill, which had sponsors from both parties, but
it still proved controversial.238

a maximum period of fifteen years from the negligent act. Limitation Periods, THOMAS
REUTERS, Aug. 1, 2016, Practical Law, 1-518-8770. Thus, the statute of limitations in
England barred Mr. Nicastro from recovering damages. It seems likely that most tort
victims with close cases as to jurisdiction would attempt to bring the case in a U.S.
forum and, if dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, would not pursue the matter in a
foreign court for some combination of these reasons.
233. Based on the Court’s recent performance, I am not holding my breath.
234. See Sachs, supra note 18, at 1325, 1330–31 (arguing that extending Rule 4(k)(2)
“would preserve some troubling aspects of current law,” e.g., plaintiffs would likely still
end up in inconvenient forums, and proposing instead that Congress enact a bill to
establish nationwide personal jurisdiction for federal courts).
235. See id. at 1325–26; see also H.R. 3304, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 1910, 113th
Cong. (2013); H.R. 3646, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 4678, 111th Cong. (2010); S. 1606,
111th Cong. (2009). When the first version of the bill was introduced in 2009,
Democrats controlled both houses of Congress and the White House. Currently
Republicans control all three. Party alignment in the federal government has not
affected the fate of the FMLAA.
236. The latest version is H.R. 3304, 114th Cong. (2015). The FMLAA has not yet
been introduced in the 115th Congress.
237. Id. § 5.
238. See Sachs, supra note 18, at 1325–26.
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An extended Rule 4(k)(2) would be preferable for several reasons.
First, although the rulemaking process is hardly simple, it is not the
dismal political swamp that Congress is. If the FMLAA cannot advance,
a bill offering a comprehensive statute directly affecting domestic
defendants would be dead on arrival. U.S. business interests would
fight vigorously against giving back the jurisdictional bonuses that the
five defense-friendly decisions of this decade have handed them, the
most important of which was—perhaps ironically—penned by one of
the Court’s most liberal members, Justice Ginsburg, in limiting general
jurisdiction over a corporation to its home.239 Equally ironic, Justice
Kennedy—perhaps the Court’s most vigorous proponent of the power
of state sovereignty against the federal government240—reasoned that
sovereignty can give the federal courts personal jurisdiction that the
Constitution does not permit state courts.241
Second, the bill is limited to certain kinds of products and claims on
them.242 An extended Rule 4(k)(2) would not be so limited because it
would apply to the full range of legal theories brought in diversity and
alienage cases.
Third, an extended Rule 4(k)(2) would work to the benefit of both
U.S. plaintiffs and defendants and result in fairer outcomes. Most
cases covered by the extended rule would look like J. McIntyre or
J. McIntyre with a U.S. co-defendant. If one takes the J. McIntyre facts
but instead assumes the defendant is incorporated in Delaware with its
principal place of business in New York (rather than both in England),
the defendant would be subject to jurisdiction in New York and
Delaware. Pursuing a case against the defendant in New York or Delaware
is a far more tenable proposition than trying to litigate in England.243
Thus, the English defendant has a considerable competitive advantage
over the hypothetical U.S. defendant because the former can avoid
relatively generous U.S. juries, while the latter cannot.244

239. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919, 929 (2011).
240. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 711, 757 (1999) (establishing that state
sovereign immunity prevents application of federal wage and hour laws to state employees).
241. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011) (plurality opinion).
242. H.R. 3304, 114th Cong. § 4(4) (listing the types of products to which the bill
would apply).
243. See supra note 232.
244. See Atiyah, supra note 232, at 1012 (finding that tort recovery in the United
States is typically ten times greater than in England).
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If one assumes the facts of J. McIntyre but with a U.S. co-defendant,245
an extended Rule 4(k)(2) would work to the advantage of the U.S.
co-defendant. It would be a considerable benefit to the U.S. defendant
to have the foreign defendant joined. If the U.S. defendant arguably
is jointly and severally liable with the foreign defendant, the U.S.
defendant could easily file an impleader claim against the foreign
defendant in the same action if they were in the same court.246 If the
foreign defendant is not a party to the proceeding, then the U.S.
defendant would be left in the position of the Asahi defendant,
attempting to pursue a separate contribution and indemnity action in
a foreign court.247 Moreover, in the highly likely event that the case
settles, the U.S. defendant would have the foreign defendant at the
settlement table to contribute to any resolution, rather than
attempting to calculate the odds and economics of passing off any
portion of the settlement to an absent party.
While not comprehensive, an extended Rule 4(k)(2) is a realistic
possibility and a broad federal statute is not. While an extended rule
would not solve all the problems that jurisdictional law presents, it
would solve the worst of them to the benefit of U.S. plaintiffs,
defendants, and the fair administration of justice.
B. Would Extending Rule 4(k)(2) Violate the Rules Enabling Act?
Federal Rules, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are
created by a relatively elaborate procedure controlled mainly by the
Standing Committee of the Judicial Conference and the Rules
Advisory Committee.248 The latter drafts and proposes amendments to
the Federal Rules, the Supreme Court chooses whether to promulgate
them, and then Congress has several months to veto them.249 For the
245. There was a U.S. co-defendant in J. McIntyre, the U.S. distributor of the
machines. See Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. 2010),
rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. 873. However, the U.S. distributor ceased to
distribute McIntyre machines in 2001. See J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 896 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). This is because the distributor went bankrupt. See Nicastro v. McIntyre
Mach. Am., Ltd., 945 A.2d 92, 95 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008), aff’d, 987 A.2d 575,
rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. 873. Thus, for practical purposes, the case was solely
against the English J. McIntyre.
246. See FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a).
247. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114–15 (1987)
(noting that the third-party claim should be dismissed and is possibly governed by
different law than the underlying claim).
248. See Wasserman, supra note 18, at 333–34 (describing the rulemaking process).
249. See id.

2017] EXTENDING FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4(K)(2)

449

most part, the proposed amendments are enacted in the form they
leave the Rules Advisory Committee’s hands, though several decades
ago there was the noted congressional override and a poorly drafted
rewrite of the service-of-process rules.250
The Rules Enabling Act251 authorizes rules if they do not “abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right.”252 Because federal rules are
authorized by a federal statute, they are largely immune from the
doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,253 which has come to be
understood to allow federal common law rules only if they will not
promote forum shopping or result in inequitable administration of the
laws.254 Federal rules are within the scope of the Rules Enabling Act as
long as they “really regulate procedure.”255 Or, as Justice John M. Harlan
put it, a federal rule need only be “arguably procedural” to pass muster.256
Contending successfully that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
violates the Rules Enabling Act is an uphill climb, to say the least.
Because the rule must pass through the Supreme Court’s hands, for a
litigant to successfully challenge a rule the litigant would have to
convince a lower court and then possibly the Supreme Court itself that
the Court erred in adopting the rule.257
250. See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 206, at 441 (highlighting the stark difference
between the quality of proposed amendments based on the body that submits them,
be it Congress or the Rules Advisory Committee).
251. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
252. § 2072(b).
253. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
254. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (holding that the outcomedetermination test cannot be read without referencing the twin aims of Erie regarding
forum shopping and inequitable administration of the laws).
255. Id. at 464 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
256. Id. at 476 (Harlan, J., concurring).
257. There have been a couple of close calls, however. At least twice, the Court has
read rules in implausibly narrow fashions, apparently to avoid a serious argument that
the rule was not really regulating procedure. In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S.
740 (1980), the Supreme Court read Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3—which states
when an action “is commenced by filing a complaint”—as not affecting the Oklahoma
rule that statutes of limitation stop when the complaint and summons is served, not
when the plaintiff files the complaint. Id. at 750–51. As a result, Federal Rule 3 was
left with almost no meaning. The Supreme Court was concerned that reading Federal
Rule 3 as trumping the stop-on-service rule would interfere with an Oklahoma
substantive policy decision. Id. at 751. In Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531
U.S. 497 (2001), the Supreme Court read language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41—which governs voluntary dismissals—regarding if a dismissal is “with prejudice” as
only precluding refiling of the action in the same federal court that the first action was
filed. Id. at 505. The Court was concerned that if Rule 41 were read to preclude an
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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain two provisions that
extend personal jurisdiction of federal courts beyond that of their state
court counterparts. One is the long-standing bulge rule that gives a
100-mile bonus to federal courts in haling supplemental parties under
Rules 14 and 19.258 The other is the current version of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(k)(2), which is limited to federal question cases.259
One might argue that the federal courts have special powers that
allow for Rule 4(k)(2) for federal question cases but not diversity cases.
However, it is difficult to see why this should be so. Diversity
jurisdiction has existed since the First Judiciary Act of 1789, while
general federal question jurisdiction did not become a permanent
fixture until after the Civil War.260 So it cannot be argued seriously that
federal question jurisdiction is more fundamental than diversity. The
likely reason for current Rule 4(k)(2)’s limitation to federal question
cases is that it was a response to Omni Capital, which was a federal
question case.261 When the Rules Advisory Committee proposed Rule
4(k)(2) in its current form, it referred only to the special powers of
federal courts without any reference to the basis upon which they
exercised subject matter jurisdiction.262 Although lower court cases
addressing whether these provisions in the federal rules violate the
Rules Enabling Act are not plentiful, they come down on the side of
upholding the relevant rule.263 Extending Rule 4(k)(2) to diversity and

action in a state court in another state that Rule 41 would violate the basic federalism
goals of Erie. Id.
258. See supra notes 206–11 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 218–27 and accompanying text.
260. See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 206, at 102 (explaining that it was not until 1875
that Congress gave federal courts original jurisdiction over federal question cases); id.
at 143 (“Ever since the First Judiciary Act, the federal courts have had original
jurisdiction of so-called diversity cases, those involving a controversy between citizens
of different states or between a citizen of a state and an alien.”).
261. See Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 100 (1987)
(noting that the original complaints were filed under the federal Securities laws).
262.
There remain constitutional limitations on the exercise of territorial
jurisdiction by federal courts over persons outside the United States. These
restrictions arise from the Fifth Amendment rather than from the Fourteenth
Amendment, which limits state-court reach and which was incorporated into
federal practice by the reference to state law in the text of the former
subdivision (e) that is deleted by this revision.
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (emphasis added).
263. See, e.g., Keith v. Freiberg, 621 F.2d 318, 319 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding
that Rule 4(d)(7), (e), and (f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules
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alienage cases would be at least as arguably procedural as the bulge
rule and the current version of Rule 4(k)(2).264
C. Is Basing Federal Court Personal Jurisdiction on
National Contacts Constitutional?
Unless some form of a national contacts test applies to the proposed
extension of Rule 4(k)(2), it would all be for naught. The Mr. Nicastros of
the world would still be left without a U.S. forum against foreign defendants.
As noted above, it is difficult to see why the difference between
extending personal jurisdiction in diversity and federal question cases
should present any constitutionally significant distinction. As the
Rules Advisory Committee noted, it is the fact that a federal court is
hearing the case that brings into play the Fifth rather than the
Fourteenth Amendment.265 Moreover, the venerable bulge rule—
which is not limited to federal question cases—would become
ineffectual in diversity cases if minimum contacts with the forum state
is a constitutional command both to state and federal courts in nonfederal question cases.266
Of course, this assumes that the national contacts test, in one form
or another, is the Fifth Amendment limitation. The Supreme Court
has played coy on this issue. In Stafford v. Briggs,267 the Court resolved
the case on statutory grounds. In his dissent, however, Justice Stewart,
Enabling Act are constitutional); cf. Archangel Diamond Corp. Liquidating Tr. v. OAO
Lukoil, 75 F. Supp. 3d 1343, 1365 (D. Colo. 2014), aff’d, 812 F.3d 799 (10th Cir. 2016)
(applying Rule 4(k)(2) in determining whether jurisdiction is proper in the face of
constitutional challenges to such jurisdiction); Dechand v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 732 F. Supp.
1120, 1122 (D. Kan. 1990) (upholding federal rules governing joinder in light of
Kansas statute).
264. Other federal rules extend the reach of federal courts.
Admiralty
Supplemental Rules B and C have been interpreted to create nationwide personal
jurisdiction in admiralty cases where the vessel is seized and Bankruptcy Rule 7004(f)
gives bankruptcy courts nationwide personal jurisdiction. See HAY, BORCHERS &
SYMEONIDES, supra note 21, at 494–97. In admiralty proceedings, the “general common
law” still applies, and in adversary proceedings in bankruptcy courts (suits by and
against the debtor) state law applies. See, e.g., In re Kewanee Boiler Corp., 270 B.R. 912,
925 (Bankr. E.D. Ill. 2002) (“[T]he mere presence of state law issues does not mean
that jurisdiction over bankruptcy issues should be left to the state courts . . . .”). The
applicable law has no bearing on whether the national contacts standard applies.
265. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment
(“These restrictions arise from the Fifth Amendment rather than from the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . .”).
266. See supra notes 206–11 and accompanying text.
267. 444 U.S. 527 (1980).
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joined by Justice Brennan, disagreed with the majority’s statutory
reading, and reached the constitutional issue of whether a federal
court could exercise national personal jurisdiction.268 They concluded
that minimum contacts with the United States as a whole, not the
forum state, was the constitutional requirement under the Fifth
Amendment.269 The majority opinion neither endorsed nor rejected
the dissent’s proposed constitutional test. In two cases in 1987
involving foreign defendants, the Court wrote brief footnotes stating
that the Fifth Amendment standard was not relevant because
Fourteenth Amendment standards were applicable under what is now
Rule 4(k)(1)(A); thus, the Court had no need to decide the issue and
said the same in throwaway dictum in Bristol-Myers.270
Lower courts take various views. One is the pure national contacts
standard, which allows jurisdiction in any federal court anywhere in
the United States, if the defendant has minimum contacts with the
United States.271 At the other pole is the view that the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment standards are identical.272 The middle view is
that while the national contacts test is the basic one, the plaintiff

268. Id. at 553–54 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
269. Id.
270. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 173 S. Ct. 1773, 1784 (2017)
(leaving open the question of whether the Fifth Amendment applies to federal court
personal jurisdiction); Omni Capital Int’l. Ltd. v. Rudolph Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97,
102 n.5 (1987) (stating the court has no occasion to address the Fifth Amendment’s
applicability to personal jurisdiction through national contacts); Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 n.* (1987) (declining to address
congressional authority of granting personal jurisdiction to federal courts “over alien
defendants based on the aggregate of national contacts”).
271. See, e.g., In re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Litig., 334 F.3d 204, 207 (2d Cir.
2003) (per curiam) (holding that a federal court’s minimum contacts analysis must
look to a corporation’s contacts with the United States as a whole to determine if the
federal court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with due process); Med.
Mut. of Ohio v. deSoto, 245 F.3d 561, 567 (6th Cir. 2001); In re LIBOR-Based Fin.
Instruments Antitrust Litig., No. 11 MDL 2262 NRB, 2015 WL 6243526, at *23
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2015) (agreeing that the national contacts test is consistent with
Second Circuit precedent), rev’d in part on rehearing, 11 MD 2262 (NRB), 2016 WL
1301175 (Mar. 31, 2016); Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 33
(D.D.C. 2010) (applying the national contacts test as the test for diversity jurisdiction);
see also HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 21, at 497 (discussing the application
of pure national contacts test as the standard in bankruptcy cases).
272. See, e.g., Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A., 119 F.3d
935, 942 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting appellee’s argument that under both Amendments,
courts must look past the defendant’s contacts with the forum state).
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cannot pick out an unreasonably inconvenient forum.273 The middle
view has found favor among commentators.274 A majority of the lower
federal courts facing the issue appear to have adopted some form of
the national contacts test.275
There are other strong suggestions that some form of the national
contacts test applies under the Fifth Amendment.276 The 1993 Rules
Advisory Committee’s notes to Rule 4(k)(2) assume that some form of
the national contacts test applies.277 If some form of the national
contacts test does not apply, Rule 4(k)(2) would be of almost no effect.
Rule 4(k)(2)(A) requires that “the defendant is not subject to
jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction.”278 If the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment standards are identical, Rule 4(k)(2) would
be of effect only in the rare case that the defendant had minimum
contacts with a forum state that has a long-arm statute that stops short of
the constitutional line, the defendant’s contacts fall between the
constitutional and statutory lines, and no other state is available. Moreover,
the venerable bulge rule279 would be of no effect. Congress also clearly
believes that it has the power to authorize federal court personal
jurisdiction on a nationwide basis as it has several times so legislated.280
The Supreme Court plurality in J. McIntyre also appeared to endorse
the possibility of broader personal jurisdiction for federal courts.
Recognizing the implications of its sovereignty-based approach, the
plurality wrote: “Because the United States is a distinct sovereign, a
defendant may in principle be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts
of the United States, but not of any particular State.”281 Then later,
after noting that the defendant clearly targeted the U.S. market, the
273. Id. at 944–48.
274. HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 21, at 483 & n.22 (endorsing the test
and noting other commentators who favor it).
275. See id. at 482–83; see also BCCI Holdings, 119 F.3d at 948 (suggesting a regional
approach with personal jurisdiction being proper for a bank with few contacts in
Florida but numerous contacts up and down the coast).
276. See Sachs, supra note 18, at 1319–20 (explaining that although the Supreme
Court has never ruled as to whether national personal jurisdiction is constitutional
under the Fifth Amendment, “the issue is about as settled by precedent as it could be”
in favor of a national contacts test).
277. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.
278. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2)(a).
279. See supra notes 206–11 and accompanying text.
280. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 22, 78aa (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (2012); 29 U.S.C. §
1132(e)(2) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 9613(P) (2012); see also HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES,
supra note 21, at 480 n.6 (collecting statutes).
281. J. McIntyre Mach. Co. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011) (plurality opinion).
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plurality stated: “It may be that, assuming it were otherwise
empowered to legislate on the subject, the Congress could authorize
the exercise of jurisdiction in appropriate courts.”282 The plurality also
did not attach any significance to the applicable law: “Nor is it
necessary to determine what substantive law might apply were
Congress to authorize jurisdiction in a federal court in New Jersey.”283
All of this appears to be an endorsement of the constitutionality of
an extension of Rule 4(k)(2) to diversity and alienage cases and a
rejection of the suggestion that the applicable law makes a difference.
The plaintiff in J. McIntyre could only have brought the action in
federal court on alienage grounds, as products liability law is state law.
The only arguably significant difference is that extending Rule 4(k)(2)
would not be direct action by Congress. But as discussed above, it
would be a permissible exercise of the power granted by Congress
under the Rules Enabling Act, and Congress would be able to veto the
change. Thus, it is difficult to see why—under the plurality’s view—it
would make any constitutional difference had Mr. Nicastro been
allowed to bring his action in New Jersey federal court under an
extended Rule 4(k)(2) or a federal statute.
Of course, this only accounts for four votes on the Court and flows
from a sovereignty rationale that the concurrence in the judgment did
not remark on and the dissent rejected.284 But it seems likely that the
Justices who signed the J. McIntyre concurrence or the dissent would
find an extended Rule 4(k)(2) constitutional, even if they rested their
votes on a fairness rather than a sovereignty rationale. An extended
Rule 4(k)(2) would apply directly only to foreign defendants because
had the J. McIntyre defendant been domestic, the plaintiff could have
sued the defendant corporation in its home state.285 The dissent
argued that it was unfair for a “foreign industrialist” to take advantage
of the U.S. market, yet be immunized from suit in the most convenient
U.S. forum.286 The concurrence’s reluctance to lay down absolutist

282. Id. at 885.
283. Id. at 885–86.
284. See id. at 899 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
285. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919, 929
(2011) (explaining that a court may assert general jurisdiction over a foreign
subsidiary of a U.S.-based corporation only when the corporation’s affiliations with the
forum state are continuous and systematic).
286. J. McIntyre, 574 U.S. at 893 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). A further hint that the
dissenters would endorse an extended Rule 4(k)(2) is their approving citation of
commentary urging that for foreign defendants the United States be viewed as a single
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anti-jurisdictional rules would militate against any blanket finding that
an extended Rule 4(k)(2) is unconstitutional.287
As a practical matter, an extended Rule 4(k)(2) would apply mainly
in cases that look like J. McIntyre.288 Under any version of a national
contacts test, the defendant would have to purposefully direct its
commercial activities toward the United States to its benefit.289
Inevitably, there will be at least one state in which the bulk of the
operative events took place, as was so with New Jersey in J. McIntyre. As
the dissenting Justices already think it constitutional to sue in that
state, they surely would find jurisdiction under an extended Rule
4(k)(2). For the plurality Justices, if there were federal law
authorization, their sovereignty concerns would be addressed.
CONCLUSION
Extending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) to diversity and
alienage cases would not resolve all the uncertainties and—in my
view—unfair results produced by current jurisdictional law. But it
would likely cure the worst of the injustices, which is leaving a U.S.
plaintiff with no U.S. forum when a defendant exploiting the U.S.
market injures the plaintiff in the United States and the suit is based
on the defendant’s U.S. activities. Extending Rule 4(k)(2) requires
meeting and overcoming two substantial legal objections. The first is
whether the extension would be allowed under the Rules Enabling Act.
However, the Supreme Court has twice promulgated rules giving
federal courts personal jurisdiction that their state court counterparts
do not have. One is the bulge rule extending a federal court’s reach
to 100 miles from the courthouse over supplemental parties brought
in under either Federal Rule 14 or 19.290 The other is the current
version of Rule 4(k)(2). Although the Supreme Court has never ruled
on the question, the bulk of the authorities—including hints from the
Supreme Court itself—suggest that the Fifth Amendment (which
would be applicable instead of the Fourteenth) is satisfied by minimum
contacts with the United States as a whole, rather than the more

market. Id. at 904 (citing Peter Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction over Foreign-Country Corporate
Defendants—Commentary on Recent Case Law, 63 OR. L. REV. 431, 433 (1984)).
287. See id. at 890 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
288. See supra notes 242–47 and accompanying text.
289. J. McIntyre, 574 U.S. at 885 (plurality opinion).
290. Federal courts sitting in bankruptcy and admiralty also have, by rule, extended
jurisdiction. See supra note 264.
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familiar rule that there must be minimum contacts with the forum
state. An extended Rule 4(k)(2) would be a practicable way to
promote the fair administration of justice.

